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1 Introduction 
 
Across the developing world, there is considerable underinvestment in children, 
reflected in low immunization rates, child malnutrition, high drop-out rates, etc. 
(Majlesi, 2015). At the same time, women lagging behind men in many domains, 
ranging from excess mortality rates (illustrated by the "missing women" phenomenon) 
to labour market opportunities. A large literature relates women empowerment with 
improved outcomes of children (Majlesi, 2015; Qian, 2008; Bobonis, 2009; Duflo, 
2003; Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997). The idea is that children do better when their 
mothers control a larger fraction of the resources. This is the rationale behind many 
micro finance schemes and conditional cash transfers programmes specifically targeted 
at women, such as PROGRESA/Opportunidades in Mexico. However, it is tricky to 
identify such a relationship without knowing what underlies the decisions made by 
parents. Also, it remains a challenge to find a good proxy for bargaining power that truly 
reflects the decision-making power of the mother in the household. 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature and uses women's earnings, relative to 
that of their husband, as a proxy for bargaining power. This is a valid proxy if we 
presume that women retain control over their own earnings. Unlike most studies in the 
literature (an exception is Majlesi, 2015), I can observe who makes decisions on 
different matters within the household, such as the use of contraception and whether the 
woman works or not. My findings indicate that the ratio of earnings of the wife to that 
of the husband is positively related to women's decision-making power in the 
household. The key question is: does it matter who makes the money in the household? 
This thesis will examine this topic in the context of Indonesia. 
 
Why Indonesia? It is an emerging economy, with average GDP growth of around 6% 
and currently more than 28 million people living below the national poverty line set at 
292,951 rupiahs ($24.4) per month. Another 68 million Indonesians remain vulnerable 
of falling into poverty, earning incomes only marginally higher than the poverty line. 
Despite great progress made in combating poverty ever since the recovery from the 
Asian Financial crisis, recently poverty reduction has slowed down. At the same time, 
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inequality is on the rise. In the battle against inequality and poverty, development 
experts suggest focusing on better nutrition, health-care and education for children from 
poor families (World Bank, 2014a).  
 
Could a larger focus on women empowerment help Indonesia to reduce poverty, to fuel 
development and to avoid falling into the middle-income growth? In this light, this 
thesis will empirically investigate how women empowerment is related to relevant 
development indicators, namely the health and education of children. Studies indicate 
that early development of human capital, both in terms of knowledge and health, is vital 
for productivity later in life (Duflo, 2003). 
 
Using two waves of panel data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) and a 
fixed effects methodology, this thesis finds that women's bargaining power has a 
significant effect on children's health, but not on education. Evaluated at the level of 
earnings of the median household in our dataset, our findings indicate that a rise in the 
yearly income of the mother from 3.250.000 rupiahs to 3.400.000 rupiahs will change 
the reported health status of the child from "unhealthy" to "very healthy", given that the 
income of the father remains unchanged. Since the information on earnings likely 
suffers from measurement error, which is exacerbated by the fixed effects approach, the 
found effects should be considered as a lower bound. Mothers with a relatively high 
income display stronger effects for girls, while mothers with a comparatively low 
income prefer to invest in the health of boys. These preferences cannot be explained by 
different locations of the households nor is it a catch-up effect. Curiously, as the income 
of the mother rises, her decision-making power over education increases while her 
influence over child health does not change significantly. 
 
However, the main threat to our analysis is that women's earned income could be an 
outcome of the bargaining process within the household, rather than as measure of 
women's bargaining power itself (Doss, 2013 and Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg, 
1997). Whether a woman works and how much she works could be all outcomes of the 
bargaining progress. This would make labour earnings endogenous to our model. If the 
reason that the wife's income has increased over time is a more progressive attitude of 
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her husband, then the same change of attitude may also be responsible for better health 
and education of the children. Consequently, the independence assumption of the fixed 
effects model would fail.  
 
Overall, this thesis concurs with findings from the literature that promoting women 
empowerment can be a promising pathway for development. This will allow developing 
countries to address multiple facets of the previous Millennium Development Goals at 
once: namely, child education, child health and gender equality. To implement this 
strategy, key factors that emerged are improving labour market opportunities for women 
and strengthening the rights of women in the realm of marriage and divorce. Future 
research could look at how women empowerment spills over to other fields of 
household decision-making that are considered important for development, like savings 
behaviour of poor households and investment in goods such as malaria nets. Also, it 
should assess how creating a level playing field for both genders can best be achieved 
and how cost-effective it is as a development strategy. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reveals previous empirical work 
regarding the topic of women's bargaining power and development. Section 3 provides 
the theoretical background on determinants of bargaining position of women in the 
household. Section 4 focuses in on the case of Indonesia regarding the bargaining 
position of women. Also, previous empirical findings on Indonesia are discussed. 
Section 5 presents the main data and reports descriptive statistics. The empirical strategy 
is explained in section 6. Section 7 discusses the estimation results. This is followed by 
sensitivity checks examining whether there are differential effects depending on the 
initial level of income of the mother. Finally, section 8 concludes and highlights 
directions for future research and policy implications. 
 
2 Previous literature 
 
How women empowerment is related to development outcomes has been broadly 
investigated in the empirical literature, both in the context of the developing world and 
in developed countries. The bargaining power of women in the household cannot be 
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observed therefore studies use different proxies. Common definitions of women's 
bargaining power in the household include income measures. One can look at a 
temporary boost in her income by conditional cash programs directed at women versus a 
more permanent rise in her income or opportunities on the labour market (which can 
also boost her bargaining power in the household, even when she is not working, as we 
will see).  Then other studies look at assets held by women before marriage, the level of 
her human capital (as obtained in education) and more indirect measures of women 
empowerment, like the level of political representation. It can be a challenge to find a 
good proxy for women's bargaining power. There may be institutional changes to 
promote women empowerment (e.g. changes in land rights) but there is no directly 
observable change in the measure of bargaining power, namely the land owned by 
women (Doss, 2013). 
 
Most of the reviewed studies do not have a direct measure of who makes decisions in 
the household. Instead, they use earnings or labour market opportunities as a proxy for 
bargaining power within the household. An exception is study conducted by Majlesi 
(2015) that directly observes whom within the couples makes the decisions on different 
kind of topics, such as purchase of clothing and use of contraception. He shows that 
changes in women's employment opportunities are indeed related to greater decision-
making power within the household in the context of Mexico. 
 
Various outcome measures of development are encountered in the literature. Since a 
common perception is that women care more about their children than men do, many 
empirical studies look at children's health outcomes such as height-for-age and weight-
for-height measures (Doss, 2013). Also the educational attainment of children is 
frequently studied. Other papers look at consumption patterns. This is what Lundberg, 
Pollak and Wales (1997) do in the context of the U.K., as they investigate whether 
spending changes from private goods, such as men's or women's clothing, to goods that 
benefit the entire household, which is presumed to be children's clothing. On a more 
aggregate level, a study on the political representation of women in India focuses on the 
expenditure of public goods. Most studies are conducted in the context of the 
developing world, where gender equality and women empowerment are relevant topics 
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in the light of fueling the development process, however there is also some empirical 
evidence from developed countries. 
 
A substantial number of empirical papers has found a correlation between measures of 
women's bargaining power and development outcomes such as children's health and 
education (Duflo, 2012). The problem with these studies is that they do not directly 
measure the bargaining power of the women.  While proxies for bargaining power, such 
as education and income, are included in the analysis, other important factors that may 
directly influence child outcomes, such as family background and ability, are 
unobserved. Also, it could be the case that better educated or richer women are able to 
marry more progressive men, who care more about the outcomes of their children. Then 
a larger female income may not be attributed to a better bargaining position of women, 
but to different preferences of the husbands.  
 
However, the main identification challenge is that families where the wife earns more, 
may be different from households where the woman has a relatively low income in ways 
that also affect investment in their children. For example, households where the wife 
earns more may be more progressive and therefore invest more in the well-being of their 
children (Duflo, 2012). Therefore, empirical studies have sought different ways to deal 
with this causality problem. Various approaches have been used, including natural 
experiments and shifts in policies, instrumental variable techniques and randomized 
control trails. 
 
Since this thesis focuses on income measures as the main proxy for women's bargaining 
power, we will first review empirical studies on women's income and employment 
opportunities and how these relate to different development outcomes. Next in line, we 
look at empirical work that focus on female human capital and more indirect measures 
of women empowerment, like the level of political representation. Section 4 will 
specifically review empirical studies linking women empowerment to development in 
Indonesia. 
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Bargaining power through income and labour market opportunities 
 
The majority of empirical studies focus on income of women as proxy for her 
bargaining power in the household. If a woman can retain some control over her 
earnings, then this is a valid strategy (Doss, 2013). Other papers focus on labour market 
opportunities, which can strengthen women's bargaining power even if she is not 
currently working, as this will increase her options outside the marriage. Evidence on 
China and Mexico show that changes in permanent income and labour market 
opportunities positively affect development outcomes, such as children's health 
(Majlesi, 2015; Qian, 2008). Other papers look at short run changes in income, such as 
conditional transfers directed at women. These studies are respectively on the U.K., 
South-Africa and Mexico and also find a positive relationship between women's 
bargaining power and investment in children (Bobonis, 2009; Duflo, 2003; Lundberg, 
Pollak and Wales, 1997). 
 
The most influential paper in this field is the study by Qian (2008). She makes use of a 
policy change to investigate the relationship between female income and survival of 
girls as well as educational attainment of boys and girls in China. In the late 1970's, 
market reforms led to an exogenous change in the price of tea, which is primarily picked 
by women. Since this change is unrelated to unobserved differences between 
households, it allows us to study the effects of an increase in women's bargaining power. 
Qian finds that an increase in relative adult female income has an immediate and 
positive effect on the survival rate of girls. In rural China, during the early 1980s, 
increasing annual adult female income by $7.70 (10% of average rural household 
income) while holding adult male income constant increased the fraction of surviving 
girls by one percentage point and improved educational attainment for both boys and 
girls by approximately 0.5 years. 
 
A similar approach is used by Majlesi (2015) in Mexico. He relates the changes in local 
manufacturing industries in Mexico in 2002-2005 to the chances of being employed for 
women. Hereby a women's bargaining power is not defined as her actual income but as 
her potential employment opportunities in the place of residence. Majlesi argues that 
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bargaining power of married women better corresponds to how much a woman could 
earn in the labour market, irrespective of whether now she is working or not, hence her 
outside option. Another unique facet of this study is that the researcher has a direct 
measure of women's decision making power. The survey data used describe whether the 
wife or husband make decisions on a variety of matters, such as the use of contraception 
and children's health. Subsequently, women’s aggregate relative decision making power 
is defined as the number of household decisions made by wife minus the number of 
decisions made by her husband. The main findings are that an increase in the bargaining 
position of women leads to women making more decisions on her own expenditures, 
major expenditures of the household and children's health. Most interestingly, more 
employment opportunities for women have a positive effect on the health of their 
children (especially that of girls), when controlling for other factors such as total 
household income. 
 
It can be questioned whether  temporary changes in women's income, induced by 
conditional transfer programs targeted at mothers of poor households for example, have 
the same impact as permanent changes in her earnings or employment opportunities. 
Duflo (2012) notes that state benefit programs may not increase a women's bargaining 
power much because after a few years women income goes back to normal so she 
cannot extract her power too much. In this light, Bobonis (2009), Duflo (2003) and 
Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) look at the outcomes of children in Mexico, South-
Africa and the U.K. respectively. Their empirical evidence shows that even temporary 
changes in women's income can strengthen their bargaining power and alter 
development outcomes. 
 
While Duflo and Lundberg, Pollak and Wales exploit a change in government policy 
regarding state benefit programs, Bobonis makes use of a randomized controlled trial in 
the context of the Mexican poverty reduction program PROGRESA. This program 
provides income transfers to women in low-income households, conditional on 
children's school attendance and use of various health services. The experimental 
methodology helps to identify causal relationships.  As the households are randomly 
assigned to treatment and comparison groups, on average they will be comparable in 
  
 9 
 
 
 
terms of observable as well as unobservable characteristics like progressiveness, family 
background and ability. In this way, we can trace out the causal effects of higher female 
income. Findings indicate that a temporary boost in women's income leads to an 
increase in the expenditure of child and female clothing. 
 
The results are supported by a study in the British context by Lundberg, Pollak and 
Wales. As a result of shift of payment of the universal child benefit program to the 
mothers instead of the fathers, the researchers find a substantial increase in spending on 
women's and children's clothing, relative to men's clothing. This is consistent with the 
idea that children do better when their mothers control a larger fraction of family 
resources. Although developed countries have seen rising levels of development as well 
as gender equality, the study was conducted around the 1970's when women’s share of 
employment in the formal labour market was expanding. 
 
Even transfer programs that are not specifically targeted at mothers in poor households 
can make a difference. Duflo (2003) has studied the reform of the pension system in 
South-Africa and finds that an increase in the income of grandmothers has a positive 
effect on the health of the children that live with her in the household, while receipt of a 
pension by the grandfather does not. Health indicators used are weight-for-height and 
height-for-age, which capture both short run and long run states of child nutrition. The 
finding confirms the hypothesis that female bargaining power in the household matters 
for development outcomes. 
 
Female human capital and other proxies for women empowerment 
 
A related branch of the literature looks at women empowerment in the broader sense. In 
particular, these papers take women's human capital and the level of political 
representation as proxies for the bargaining power of women. Education can lead to 
higher wages and improve the chances of finding a job and therefore strengthens the 
bargaining position of women in the household. The findings are mixed. Two papers do 
not find any relationship between female education and child health. The studies are 
respectively on Indonesia by Breierova and Duflo (2004) and on Taiwan by Chou, Liu, 
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Grossman and Joyce (2010).  
 
Both studies exploit natural experiments that led to an exogenous variation in female 
education, namely massive education expansion programs initiated by the local 
government. Using a natural experiment is vital for unraveling a causal relationship, as 
simply comparing family outcomes of more educated women with those of less 
educated women would give us a biased picture, since more educated women often 
come from richer families and may be able to marry more progressive husbands (Duflo, 
2012). Breierova and Duflo found that higher education of women is not related to 
lower infant mortality, while Chou, Liu, Grossman and Joyce report that female and 
male education both matter for child health. This implies that the assumption that 
education of women is more important than male education for the health of their 
children and for other family outcomes may need to be revised - it seems that both 
matter. 
 
Another study takes political representation as a measure of women empowerment. 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) investigate the impact of the reservation of seats for 
women in the local village councils on the types of public goods provided in India. The 
researchers find that a higher proportion of women in the local government leads to 
investment in different types of infrastructure that better reflects the needs of local 
women. This evidence supports the notion that women empowerment can impact 
development outcomes and that women and men have different preferences, also on the 
aggregate level. 
 
Summarizing 
 
Summarizing, there is a large literature showing that overall women's bargaining power 
plays a role in development outcomes.  Most studies do not observe women's decision 
making power directly, but instead use proxies for it, such as employment opportunities 
for women. Evidence from different developing countries indicates that there is 
significant effect of female bargaining power obtained through income and labour 
market opportunities. Countries examined include Mexico, China, South-Africa and 
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India. It is a surprising finding that women's education does not seem to affect 
development outcomes (according to two empirical studies), albeit human capital is 
expected to improve the bargaining position of a woman in the household. Also, more 
educated women can make better informed choices for their children. 
 
This study aims to fill the literature gap by investigating how female earnings are related 
to children's health and education in Indonesia. As to yet, there is no research that relates 
the distribution of power in the household to the level of education of children in 
Indonesia. Unlike most studies in the literature (an exception is Majlesi, 2015), I have a 
direct measure of women's decision-making power. In this way, I am able to relate 
changes in women's relative income within the household to changes in their decision-
making power and finally to the observed differences in measures that indicate the well-
being of their children. Observing households over multiple time periods will allow me 
to use a fixed effects methodology and correct for unobserved differences between 
households that we are worried about, like progressiveness and family background. 
 
3 Theoretical framework 
 
In the previous section, we have found a strong empirical link between female 
bargaining power and development outcomes. This section will provide a theoretical 
framework to explain why women's bargaining power matters. The focus is on married 
couples. Drawing from household behavioural theories, it will focus on questions such 
as: do households make decisions as a single entity? If not, what are the determinants of 
bargaining power of husbands and wives? We will explore financial factors that 
emerged from the empirical studies, like earnings and labour market opportunities. But 
we will find that even institutional factors, such as divorce laws, influence the dynamics 
of intra-household bargaining. 
 
Traditional models of household behavior assume that household members behave as a 
single entity and maximize a single utility function. The decisions made could be the 
outcome of consensus among the family members (Samuelson, 1956) or the preferences 
of one dominant family member (Becker, 1981). The model implies that all family 
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resources are pooled and then allocated to maximize a single objective function. This 
implies that female earnings should not matter for development - income earned by the 
wife should have the same effect on household decisions as income earned by the 
husband. In contrast, non-unitary models of the household relax this assumption and 
allow for differential effects. 
 
Non-unitary models allow for bargaining over the consumption of goods and other 
relevant decisions within the household. In the intra-household bargaining process, the 
situation on the labour market plays a large role (Manser and Brown, 1980). Whether 
the woman can work and the size of the earnings she could make, determine her 
bargaining position within the household. If it is relatively hard for the woman to work 
and hence support herself, she does not have a strong outside option outside the 
marriage. In effect, this lowers her bargaining power in the household and her influence 
over relevant decisions. However, if the wife has many employment opportunities, she 
can make a credible threat to leave the marriage if the husband does not consider her 
opinion and preferences. This results in a large financial bargaining power and hence a 
large influence over decision-making. Education may enhance her bargaining power as 
it increases her opportunities on the labour market. 
 
Not only employment opportunities affect women's bargaining power, but also 
institutional factors matter. Whether the threat to divorce is credible or not depends on 
local laws governing the ease of divorce and women's rights after divorce (Majlesi, 
2015; Duflo, 2012). It matters whether the woman can remarry or retain some control 
over the assets that she brought into the marriage. All these factors shape the outside 
options of a woman. If both she and her husband know that divorce is not possible, this 
gives the husband power to impose decisions on his wife. In this way, laws and customs 
regarding divorce influence decision-making within the household even if the couple 
does not end up divorcing.  
 
4 The context of Indonesia 
 
A process of change - women's bargaining power in Indonesia on the macro-level 
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Now we can apply the theoretical framework that explains women's bargaining power to 
the case of Indonesia. Regarding labour market opportunities, women's participation in 
the labour force has been fairly constant since the 1990's as one can learn from Figure 1. 
In the non-agricultural sector, women only constitute 33% of the labour force. In terms 
of labour market access, Indonesia is still lagging behind other developing countries in 
South-East Asia. This limits the financial bargaining power of women, as employment 
opportunities are an important factor in her outside option. However, the government of 
Indonesia has been pushing for an expansion of education and as a matter of fact, more 
women complete primary education than men (World Bank Gender Statistics). 
 
The legal and cultural framework also shape women's decision-making power in the 
household. Historically, in practice the right to divorce in Indonesia was exclusively 
reserved to men. However, due to pressure of women's rights organizations, over time it 
has become easier for women to file for divorce (O'Shaughnessy, 2009). Also, it matters 
whether women can keep the assets she brought to the marriage in case of divorce. 
There is a large variation in this practice across the diverse cultural contexts of 
Indonesia, depending on the local customs (Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg, 1997). 
 
Figure 1: Ratio of female to male labor force participation (in %) 
 
 
Source: Gender Statistics, World Bank: http://datatopics.worldbank.org/gender/country/indonesia 
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Now we will examine previous empirical work linking women empowerment to 
development in Indonesia. 
 
Previous empirical work on women's bargaining power and children outcomes in 
Indonesia 
 
The most prominent data source on Indonesia is the Indonesian Family Life Survey 
(IFLS). It is a rich dataset on the household level with information on a variety of topics, 
including household decision-making, health and income. Many studies have explored 
the IFLS data and are on topics such as the effects of the financial crisis in 1997 and the 
determinants and consequences of health (an example is the long-term health effects on 
the next generation of Ramadan fasting during pregnancy). However there are few 
studies on household bargaining and children's well-being. An exception is Thomas, 
Contreras and Frankenberg (1997). 
 
Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg (1997) investigate how bargaining power within 
the household is related to child health outcomes. Their definition of bargaining power 
revolves around the value of resources that husbands and wives bring to the marriage. In 
the Indonesian context, traditionally in Javanese families the partners keep the resources 
they brought to the marriage under their control. This measure is directly related to 
women's outside option and could be considered as a more permanent measure of their 
bargaining power within the household. 
 
The researchers explore how the value of assets of the husband versus those of the wife 
affect the health status of their children. In particular, whether child had experienced 
one of several morbidities during the four weeks prior to the survey, such as a cough, 
fever or diarrhea. They find that that mothers who are more powerful allocate resources 
towards their sons, as is reflected in their sons having fewer episodes of illness (of 
cough and fewer) than their daughters. This holds for Java and Sumatra. However, for 
the rest of Indonesia, the unitary household model cannot be rejected. 
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As to yet, there is no research that relates the distribution of power in the household to 
the level of education of children in Indonesia. Also, no studies exploit the panel nature 
of IFLS data to correct for unobserved differences between households. Observing 
households over multiple time periods will allow me to use a fixed effects methodology 
and correct for unobserved differences between households that we are worried about, 
like progressiveness and family background. 
 
The contribution of this thesis 
 
This study aims to fill the literature gap by exploring the relationship between woman's 
income (which reflects financial bargaining power), her decision-making power and 
child outcomes using panel data. This has not been done before in the context of 
Indonesia. The hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 
 
     (1) The size of the earnings of married women, relative to that of their husband, 
affects the health of their children 
 
     (2)  The size of the earnings of married women, relative to that of their husband, 
affects the level of education of their children 
 
     (3)  The size of the earnings of married women, relative to that of their husband, 
affects the amount of decisions they make in the household 
 
Basically, this thesis aims to test whether children's outcomes improve as the financial 
bargaining power of women rises. This is what is captured by hypotheses (1) and (2). 
However, relative earnings is just a proxy for bargaining power. In order for female 
earnings to be a good proxy for women’s bargaining power in the household, I need to 
assume that married women keep (largely) control over their own earnings. Testing 
whether this actually holds across the large cultural, social and economic diversity of 
households in Indonesia goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, hypothesis (3) 
will examine how women’s earnings are related to their decision-making power within 
the household. The construction of a measure of women’s decision-making power is 
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further explained in the next section. Hypothesis (3) allows us to assess whether the 
income of the mother is a good proxy for her bargaining power. The key question is: do 
mothers get more influence over decisions made in the household as their income rises? 
In this way, hypothesis (3) explores the link between female earnings and the health and 
education of children. 
 
A necessary condition for gender to make a difference on child outcomes is that men 
and women must have different preferences. Namely, women should be more willing to 
make investments in their children, compare to their husbands. I cannot observe these 
preferences, but will try to infer them by tracking difference in child outcomes as 
women's financial bargaining power and decision-making power change. The 
"inferential approach" was coined by Thomas (1990). 
 
5 Data 
 
To investigate how women's financial bargaining power affects the outcomes of their 
children, I use panel data collected from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). The 
sample is representative of about 83% of the Indonesian population and contains over 
30.000 individuals living in 13 of the 27 provinces in the country (Frankenberg and 
Thomas, 2000). A visual representation of the IFLS provinces can be found in Figure 2 
below.  
 
Figure 2: Map of Indonesian Family Life Survey provinces 
 
Source: http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS.html 
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For this analysis, I will use data from the two latest waves of the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey, conducted in 2000 and 2007/2008. There are more data available in earlier 
waves (conducted in 1993 and 1997) but I do not use them due to the occurrence of the 
Asian financial crisis. The crisis hit Indonesia in 1997 and led to extreme rates of 
inflation up to 65% per year (Hill, 2000). As our main variable of interest, namely 
female earnings, will likely be distorted in these years, I decided not to use the earlier 
waves of the IFLS. 
 
The nature of the data allows me to match information on children with the data on 
earnings and background of the parents. I excluded children whose mother or father is 
no longer alive or who live away from one of their parents. I set the cut-off age for 
children at 25 years in 2007/2008. In this way I can capture the probability that children 
attend university or college as a result of increased financial bargaining power of their 
mother, as these children are be around 17 years old in 2000. I focus on households that 
are headed by a married couple. Households where the husband is married to two or 
more spouses and living together with them, are excluded from the analysis. The criteria 
result in a total of 1320 children from 668 households. 
 
As is often the case with household survey data from developing countries, the quality 
of the data is not optimal. In particular, for the earnings variable there appear to be a 
discrepancy. Different yearly income figures are reported for the parents, depending on 
whether the household head answered the question or the response came from the 
household member him- or herself.  I stick to the answer given by the household 
member him- or herself, but if no self-reported income information is available, I take 
the figure mentioned by the household head. 
 
The characteristics of the data, which I extracted from the Indonesian Family Life 
Surveys, are summarized in Table 1. Table 2 shows how the values of relevant variables 
differ between boys and girls in 2000. A detailed description of all variables can found 
in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all children 
Variables Mean 2000 Mean 
2007/2008 
Mean 
difference 
Std. dev. 
2000 
Std. dev. 
2007/2008 
Std. dev. 
diff. 
Education 
level 1.989 3.106 1.117*** 0.802 0.957 0.154 
Health 
condition 3.039 3.099 0.061** 0.443 0.484 0.040 
Age 8.231 15.604 7.373*** 4.609 4.600 -0.009 
Boy 0.541 0.542 0.001 0.499 0.498 0.000 
Log earnings 
mother 14.345 15.319 0.974*** 1.461 1.345 -0.116 
Log earnings 
father 15.069 15.753 0.684*** 1.093 1.172 0.079 
Education 
mother 2.683 2.781 0.098** 1.151 1.194 0.043 
Education 
father 2.893 2.922 0.029 1.173 1.198 0.025 
Age mother 36.098 43.342 7.244*** 5.767 5.727 -0.040 
Age father 40.617 47.825 7.208*** 7.079 6.826 -0.253 
Household 
size 6.405 6.915 0.511*** 2.140 2.299 0.160 
Muslim 0.861 0.858 -0.002 0.346 0.349 0.002 
Protestant 0.049 0.053 0.004 0.216 0.224 0.008 
Catholic 0.014 0.018 0.005 0.116 0.134 0.018 
Hindu 0.074 0.070 -0.005 0.262 0.255 -0.008 
Buddhist 0.002 0.000 -0.002* 0.048 0.000 -0.048 
Confucian 0 0.001 0.001 0 0.028 0.028 
Urban location 0.441 0.498 0.058*** 0.497 0.500 0.004 
Wife decision-
making power 3.444 3.053 -0.391*** 3.608 3.887 0.279 
Observations 1320 1320 2640 1320 1320 2640 
Notes: A detailed description of all variables can found in Table A1 in the Appendix. All variables have observations on 
1320 children per year, except for general health status which was only reported for children that are younger than 15 
years. This results in a total of 1167 observations in the year 2000 and 555 observations in the year 2007/2008 for child 
health condition. ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
One of the main variables of interest is educational attainment of children. This 
information is available for all children in my sample. On average, children attended 
elementary school in the first period of the panel and junior high school in during the 
second round of interviews. Accordingly, the average age of the children in my dataset 
is 8.2 years in 2000 and 15.6 years in 2007/2008. For a very small number of 
observations (6), there was an inconsistency in the information about education. Some 
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children reported a negative change in the level of schooling. The level of education 
attained or attending as reported in 2007/2008 was lower than the level reported in 
2000. In these cases, I stuck to the highest value reported (which was junior high school 
for nearly all cases). There is no significant difference between boys and girls when it 
comes to schooling in 2000, although girls are slightly more educated. 
The validity of this approach is supported by the fact that these children were all 22 
years or older by the year 2007/2008, so it is not likely that they will go back to primary 
school after having attended high school (which I assume they reported correctly in 
2000). 
 
Regarding children’s overall health condition, this information is only available for 
children under 15 years old. Their general health status is reported by mother on a scale 
from 1 to 4 (which corresponds to bad health and to good health). In the year 2002, the 
average reported health condition in my sample of analysis was 3.06 for girls and 3.02 
for boys. This difference is not statistically significant. Over time, the average reported 
health condition for all children increases from 3.04 to 3.1, as we can learn from Table 
1. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for girls and boys for the year 2000 
Variables Boys 
mean 
Girls mean Mean 
difference 
Std. dev. 
boys 
Std. dev. 
girls 
Std. dev. 
diff. 
Education level 1.966 2.015 -0.048 0.799 0.806 -0.007 
Health condition 3.024 3.056 -0.033 0.422 0.468 -0.046 
Age 8.261 8.196 0.064 4.660 4.552 0.108 
Log earnings 
mother 14.307 14.390 -0.083 1.500 1.413 0.086 
Log earnings father 15.047 15.094 -0.047 1.087 1.099 -0.011 
Household size 6.493 6.300 0.193 2.127 2.151 -0.024 
Observations 714 606 1320 714 606 1320 
Notes: A detailed description of all variables can found in Table A1 in the Appendix. All variables have observations on 
1320 children per year, except for general health status which was only reported for children that are younger than 15 
years. This results in a total of 634 observations for boys and 533 observations for girls for child health condition. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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At the same, the average logarithm of yearly income of the mother increased from 
14.345 to 15.319. The yearly income data are reported in rupiah. Also the yearly income 
of the husband sees a rise over the same period, however the increase of income of the 
mother is relatively larger (6,8% compared to 4,5%). This indicates that on average the 
financial bargaining power of women in the household may have increased. 
 
However, in order to relate the size of the relative earnings of the mother to her 
bargaining power in the household, we need a way to measure women's decision-
making power. In fact, the Indonesian Family Life Survey data describe who makes 
decisions on different matters in the household, such as the use of contraception and 
whether the woman works or not. Possible answers are: by the wife, by the husband, 
jointly or jointly with other household members. All 17 household decision-making 
categories are described in Table A2 in the Appendix. I make use of this information to 
construct a direct measure of women's decision-making power. However, it must be 
stressed that the information is subjective. The answers given differ depending on 
whether they are given by the husband or wife. It is a perception of power. For now, I 
stick to the information given by the mother. 
 
To construct a measure of the decision-making power of the mother, I follow Majlesi 
(2015) and use the number of decisions made by the wife minus number of decisions 
made by the husband on household affairs. Table A1 describes how these variables were 
constructed. On average, the mother made 3.4 decisions more than the husband on 
household affairs in 2000. This number changed to approximately 3 decisions in 
2007/2008. 
 
In addition, I will look specifically at who decides on children's education and children's 
health. 
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Figure 3: Who decides on children’s education and health? 
 
Notes: the above figure shows the number of households in which respectively the mother, the father or 
both parents make decisions on the education and health of their children. The data are taken from the 
Indonesian Family Life Surveys. 
 
Figure 3 shows who makes decisions on child education and health for the total of 668 
households in my sample. In the majority of households, the wife and the husband take 
the decisions on children together. However, we do not know who has the strongest say 
in the joint decision-making. Also, it is possible that even more household members 
take part in the joint decision-making (I did not construct a separate category for this). In 
less than 15% of the households, it is the mother who decides on the health and 
education of the children. In less than 5% of the households, it is the sole responsibility 
of the father. Compared to 2000, joint decision-making becomes more common in 
2007/2008. 
 
Exploring the data 
 
Figure 4 shows that there appears to be a positive relationship between the ratio of 
wife's earnings to husband's earnings and their actual decision-making power in the 
household in 2000. The measure of decision-making power is constructed by taking the 
number of decisions made by the wife minus the number of decisions made by the 
husband, as reported by the wife. This indicates that the earnings ratio may be a good 
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proxy for actual bargaining power in the household, albeit the correlation in the year 
2007/2008 is less strong (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). 
 
Figure 4: Relative female earnings and decision-making power of the wife in 2000 
 
Source data: Indonesian Family Life Surveys 
 
Figure 5: Relative female earnings and children's health in 2000 
 
Source data: Indonesian Family Life Surveys 
 
Figure 5 shows the relation between child's health and ratio of the logarithm of mothers 
earnings over the logarithm's of father’s earnings in 2000. A similar picture emerges for 
the cross-section from the year 2007/2008 (see appendix Figure A2). There appears to 
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be a positive relationship between financial bargaining power of women and children's 
health, when not controlling for other factors. From figure 6, we can note a weak but 
positive association between relative female earnings and the level of schooling of 
children. A stronger positive correlation is found for the year 2007/2008, which is 
displayed in Figure A3 of the appendix. 
 
Figure 6: Relative female earnings and children's education in 2000 
 
Source data: Indonesian Family Life Surveys 
 
However, the graphs give us a biased picture of a causal relationship between relative 
female earnings and the health and education of children. This is because households 
where women have relatively high earnings compared to their husband may be very 
different from families with low or no female earnings. Therefore, the next section 
outlines our strategy to control for these unobserved differences. 
 
6 Empirical strategy 
 
Researchers face various challenges when estimating the relationship between women's 
bargaining power and children's well-being, as discussed in section 2. The main 
challenge is that households with high female earnings relative to the husband, may be 
very different from households where the woman earns very little compared to the 
husband or the woman does not work at all. Families where the wife has more economic 
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power, may be more progressive, which is also reflected in how the parents support the 
education of the children. As this progressiveness is unobserved in the data but related 
to the relative size of female earnings, a simple estimation regressing child outcomes on 
the women's financial bargaining power will be biased. 
 
To get around this problem, I use panel data on the earnings of wives and husbands and 
the health and education of their children. Observing the households over multiple time 
periods will allow me to use a fixed effects methodology and correct for unobserved 
differences between households that are constant over time. In this way we can control 
for factors that we are worried about, like progressiveness and family background. 
Furthermore, unlike most studies in the literature (an exception is Majlesi, 2015), I have 
a direct measure of women's decision-making power, as discussed in section 5. In this 
way, I am able to relate changes in women's income relative to their spouse to changes 
in their decision-making power and finally to differences in child health and education. 
 
In order to estimate the effect of changes in women's bargaining power on children's 
outcomes, we will be running regressions of the following form: 
 
(1)      yc,i t = α + γ Earningsratioi,t  + λ Xc,i,t + + δ Year 2007 + Ɛc,i,t  
 
whereby the dependent variable yc,i t represents the general health status of child c in 
household i at time t. General health status of the child is reported by the mother on a 
scale from 1 to 4, whereby 1 represents bad health and 4 very good health. The 
drawback of this measure is that it is subjective, which makes it hard to compare scores 
across households. However, as we use a household fixed effects approach, we will be 
only comparing answers given by the same mother so the subjectivity will not bias our 
results. Also, we run regressions with the level of schooling of child c in household i at 
time t as alternative indicator for children's well-being. The level of education is a 
reported on a scale from 1 to 5 according to different categories (more details can be 
found in Table A1 in the Appendix). 
 
Earningsratio is the ratio of the logarithm of wife's earnings over the logarithm's of 
  
 25 
 
 
 
husband's earnings in household i at time t. Hence the coefficient γ captures the effect of 
increased financial bargaining power of women on children's well-being. Most 
importantly, the estimation contains a dummy for each household i, capturing all factors 
that are constant within the household over time, such as progressiveness and family 
background. Hence, the model exploits variation in the variables within households, i.e. 
between siblings and over time. 
 
Apart from the household fixed effects, we use set of control variables X, as indicated 
by the literature, that are found to influence children's outcomes. The gender and age of 
the child are included in the estimation. Also, information on the family background is 
taken on board, notably the level of education of the mother and the father and the age 
of the parents. More educated parents could have a better understanding of how to raise 
how to raise children, use contraception, and manage their homes (Duflo, 2012). Also, 
we control for the size of the household. If there more siblings or grandparents start 
living in the household, the parents may have less time or resources available for the 
child. Religious background is included in the estimation to control for potential 
differences in education and health between families from different religious 
background, as for example Islamic education is widespread in Indonesia and runs a 
different curriculum parallel to the general educational system. The estimation includes 
a dummy indicating whether the household is located in an urban area, as these families 
could have better access to health facilities and schools. 
 
Since we use panel dataset with two periods of data, in essence the empirical 
specification that is estimated is the difference version of equations (1) for the two time 
periods. A dummy for the year 2007 is incorporated in the model to capture any 
potential trend in children's health and education over time. In this way, we avoid 
spuriously attributing overall better health or schooling of children (due to better 
vaccination programs, sanitation, increased school enrollment etc.) to increased relative 
female earnings. Finally Ɛc,i,t represents the error term. 
 
 
 
  
 26 
 
 
 
Girls vs. boys and channels 
 
Across the developing world, there is some evidence that women value daughters 
relatively more than men do (Duflo, 2012). Therefore, the estimation will be done 
separately for boys and girls. In this way, we can see whether there exist differential 
effects of the increase of bargaining power of women on the outcomes of sons versus 
daughters. 
 
The estimation outlined above investigates the effect of changes in income of women 
compared to that of their husband. The earnings ratio is used as a proxy for bargaining 
power, however it is just that - a proxy. It is not a direct measure of power of women in 
the household. In order to assess whether power shifts are really the link between 
relative income changes and changes in children's well-being, we will empirically 
examine how decision-making in the household changes as the relative income of 
women changes. Another key question is: do decisions on children's health and 
education change hands as women's financial power increases? I will estimate 
estimation (1) again, but then use overall decision-making power of women, who makes 
the decision on children's health and who makes the decision on children's education as 
dependent variables. 
 
Some caveats 
 
For this analysis, we need to keep in mind that the earnings measures suffer from 
considerable measurement error (as discussed in more detail in section 5). Since we use 
a fixed effects approach, measurement error will be exacerbated. The mistakes become 
larger percentage-wise when we take the difference within households between the two 
time periods. This may lead to a bias towards zero in the regression results. We need to 
keep in mind that the estimate we obtain is a lower bound of the effect of women's 
financial bargaining power on children's outcomes and on household decision-making. 
This means that the true effect will likely larger be and more significant. 
 
Also, it should be noted that my sample only includes families with women who work 
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and who reported an independent income, either derived from a wage job or own 
business. This means that there is some degree of positive selection. For example, the 
households in the sample could be characterized as relatively progressive households, 
because all women are out earning an independent income. This limits the external 
validity of the results, as they may not be representative for women who do not work. 
However, the internal validity of this study is not compromised because I correct for 
unobserved differences between households that are fixed over time. 
 
7 Results 
 
The results of our main estimations on children's outcomes are reported in Table 3 and 
Table 4 below. Table 5 shows how relative earnings of the mother are related to her 
decision-making power in the household. 
 
Financial bargaining power and children’s health 
 
We find that the relative earnings of mothers are significantly and positively associated 
with the health condition of their children. Respectively, Table 3 reports a 1% change in 
the earnings ratio (implying that the yearly income of the wife rises by 1% while 
keeping the yearly income of the husband constant), will lead to an average raise of 
0.650 in reported health condition for all children, keeping all other factors constant. 
The said effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Evaluated at the level of 
earnings of the median household in our dataset, this implies that a rise in the yearly 
income of the mother from 3.250.000 rupiahs to 3.400.000 rupiahs will change the 
reported health status of the child from unhealthy to very healthy. This effect is to be 
expected while the earnings of the father stay constant at 5.000.000 rupiahs per year. 
 
Another noteworthy finding is that the effect of an increase in relative female earnings 
on health status is about 30% larger for girls. The effect for girls is no longer statistically 
significant in column (3) of Table 3, but this could be due to the smaller sample size and 
the large measurement error in the earnings variable. My results are consistent with 
findings from the literature. Maljesi (2015) also finds stronger effects of women’s 
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labour market opportunities on health for girls in the case of Mexico. In rural China, 
Qian (2008) finds that an increase in relative adult female income has an immediate and 
positive effect on the survival rate of girls and not for boys. 
 
Table 3: The effect of women's financial bargaining power on children's health 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All children Boys Girls 
Relative female earnings 
   0.650
**
 
(0.253) 
0.559
*
 
(0.310) 
0.729 
(0.455) 
Household size 0.00198 
(0.0274) 
0.0519 
(0.0458) 
-0.0135 
(0.0466) 
Boy 0.00281 
(0.0333) 
  
Age child 0.00619 
(0.00452) 
0.00197 
(0.00744) 
0.00617 
(0.0103) 
Urban 
0.253
***
 
(0.0827) 
0.246
**
 
(0.108) 
0.267
*
 
(0.159) 
Education parents Yes Yes Yes 
Age parents Yes Yes Yes 
Religious dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of children 1722 931 791 
No. of households 637 453 403 
Adj. R
2
 
0.129 0.125 0.098 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimation includes household fixed effects and a time 
dummy for the year 2007/2008. A detailed description of all variables can found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The 
results regarding the assumptions of the panel data model for column (1) as well as a step-wise regression of the model 
can be found on p. 35-39 in the Appendix. 
***, **, and * indicate statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
 
It appears that mothers have a preference for girls. Could this be a catch-up effect, i.e. 
that mothers prefer to invest more in daughters because they were previously lagging 
behind in terms of health compared to sons? This does not appear to be the case since 
there is no significant difference between boys and girls in terms of health status in 
2000, as reported in Table 2. In fact, girls had a slightly better reported health condition 
in 2000 on average. 
 
The location of the household strongly predicts the health condition of the child. 
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Moving to an urban area from a rural area is associated with an increase of 0.253 in 
reported health condition for all children, ceteris paribus. The said effect is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This may be related to differences in access and quality of 
health facilities, as many rural areas have small clinics rather than hospitals, with high 
rates of absenteeism (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). 
 
Financial bargaining power and children’s education 
 
Table 4: The effect of women's financial bargaining power on children's education 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All children Boys Girls 
Relative female earnings -0.0315 
(0.185) 
-0.119 
(0.244) 
0.0484 
(0.266) 
Household size 
-0.0655
***
 
(0.0201) 
-0.0469
*
 
(0.0275) 
-0.0908
***
 
(0.0304) 
Boy 
-0.0618
**
 
(0.0299) 
  
Age child 
0.140
***
 
(0.00376) 
0.128
***
 
(0.00676) 
0.152
***
 
(0.00761) 
Urban 0.0688 
(0.0650) 
-0.0156 
(0.0819) 
0.116 
(0.0989) 
Education parents Yes Yes Yes 
Age parents Yes Yes Yes 
Religious dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of children 2640 1429 1211 
No. of households 688 500 452 
Adj. R
2
 
0.758 0.761 0.788 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimation includes household fixed effects and a time 
dummy for the year 2007/2008. A detailed description of all variables can found in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
***, **, and * indicate statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Table 4 shows that women's financial bargaining power does not appear to have a 
significant effect on the educational attainment of children, although again the effect on 
girls is slightly larger compared to boys. Qian (2008) does find an effect of female 
income on years of educational attainment of children in rural China. However, our 
results do not imply that the mother's relative earnings are not related to children's 
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education in Indonesia. In this analysis, we use a very broad measure of level of 
schooling, namely educational categories that take up to 6 years to complete. It could be 
the case that the effect of a change in women's bargaining power on educational 
attainment is lagged. Once the mother has more power over the decision to send her 
child to school, it may take time before the child starts attending or completes a higher 
educational level. This may not be captured by the data we are currently using. If we 
would have used a more progressive measure instead, such as years of schooling or 
probability of dropping out of school, possibly there could be an effect. 
 
The biggest determinant of educational attainment is the age of the child. On average, an 
increase in the age of the child of approximately 7 years will lead to progression to one 
higher educational category, keeping all other factors constant. This holds for all 
children. The respective educational categories are described in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. Given the characteristics of the average child in 2000, when the child's age 
increases from 8 years to 15 years, he or she moves from primary school to junior high 
school. 
 
A larger household size negatively impacts schooling attainment of children, all else 
fixed. I conjecture that if more siblings and/or grandparents start living with the family, 
this may increase the chances of the child dropping out of school in order to work and 
contribute to the household economy. However it goes beyond the scope of this paper to 
further explore this empirically.  
 
Do decisions change hands as female income rises? 
 
So far we have found a positive and significant impact of female relative earnings on 
children's health, but not on education. What is the mechanism behind this relationship? 
Is the earnings ratio actually a good proxy for bargaining power and does it capture 
decision-making power in the household? Table 5 below shows the results of a panel 
regression of female decision-making power, as perceived by the wife, on relative 
female earnings. The estimation is ran on the household level. In this way, we can find 
out whether decisions actually change hands as women's income rises. 
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Overall, the results in column (1) indicate that there is a positive relationship between 
relative earnings and decision-making in the household. Namely, a 1% change in the 
ratio of female to male earnings leads to approximately 2 decisions more taken by the 
wife on household affairs, keeping all other factors constant. However, the said effect is 
not statistically significant. The effect is quite large, given that there are only 17 
decisions in total in this household survey. The different decision-making categories are 
described in Table A2 of the Appendix and range from the use of contraception to large 
expensive purchases for the household. Also, an increase in the level of education of the 
mother are positively associated with her decision-making power, albeit not 
significantly so. Majlesi (2015) does find a significant effect of an improvement of the 
wife's labour market position on the number of decisions she makes in the household. 
 
Table 5: The effect of women's financial bargaining power on household decision-making 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Overall decision-
making power 
Who decides on 
child education? 
Who decides on 
child health? 
Relative female 
earnings 
2.277 
(1.710) 
0.489** 
(0.226) 
0.331 
(0.228) 
Education mother 0.135 
(0.624) 
0.0658 
(0.0652) 
0.0739 
(0.0561) 
Education father 0.0273 
(0.443) 
-0.0834* 
(0.0456) 
-0.0371 
(0.0466) 
Household size 0.181 
(0.170) 
0.000395 
(0.0181) 
0.0142 
(0.0223) 
Urban 0.226 
(0.475) 
0.0510 
(0.0524) 
0.0698 
(0.0549) 
Age parents Yes Yes Yes 
Religious 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
No. of households 688 688 688 
Adj. R
2
 
0.188 0.099 0.114 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimation includes household fixed effects and a time 
dummy for the year 2007/2008. A detailed description of all variables can found in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Information on who make the decisions is reported by the wife. The dependent variable decision-making power is 
constructed as follows: no. of decisions made by the wife minus no. of decisions made by the husband. All 17 different 
decision-making categories are described in Table A2 of the Appendix. The dependent variables decisions on child 
education and child health are coded as follows: "1" if the mother decides, "-1" if the father decides and "0" for a joint 
decision. 
***, **, and * indicate statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
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Do the decisions on children in particular change hands as wives start to earn more in 
relative terms? The results are reported in column (2) and (3) of Table 5 and are 
somewhat surprising in the light of previous findings. We find that decisions on 
children's schooling change hands in favour of the wife as mothers earn more in relative 
terms. Decision-making on children's health is not significantly affected by relative 
female earnings. This is contrary to what we expected, as we found that women's 
relative income has a significant impact on children's health but not on children's 
education. Majlesi (2015) finds the opposite for the case of Mexico: decisions on 
children's health change hands as women's bargaining power rises, but decisions on 
education do not. 
 
What could explain these surprising results? First of all, in the large majority of couples 
(more than 75%), the wife and the husband decide together on the health and schooling 
of their children, as shown in Figure 3. The number of households, who decide together 
on the health and schooling of their children, increases even further for the period 
2007/2008. This means that in general, the investment in the well-being of the children 
is seen as a responsibility for both parents. Overall, mothers already have quite a say in 
the welfare of their children (as she decides together with her husband in the majority of 
households). A small increase in the bargaining power of the mother should not imply 
that it is in the interest of the family that the mother takes over the decisions completely. 
Nevertheless, joint decision-making does not mean that the two parents have an exactly 
equal influence over the decisions over the children. We do not observe whom of the 
two parents has the strongest say in the joint decisions. It could be the case that the 
mother gets a stronger voice in the decision-making as her income rises, although the 
couple still decides together. 
 
Regarding children's education, an increase of 2% in the earnings of the mother 
compared to the income of the father, leads to a significant increase of decision-making 
power of the mother, all else fixed. If previously the couple decided together on child 
education, now the mother takes the sole responsibility. In the other case, if previously 
the father was the main decision-maker, now the decision-making is shifted to the 
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couple. Given the insignificant relationship between children's education and relative 
female earnings we found in the previous section, this significant effect is somewhat 
unexpected. It could be the case that the benefits of mother's decision-making on 
children's schooling are present but take longer to materialize. This could be the reason 
that we cannot capture the link between decision-making power, relative earnings and 
schooling outcomes in this analysis. For our current measure of education, we are 
looking at completing an entire educational level (like junior high school or senior high 
school). If information would be available on a more progressive measure of education, 
like years of schooling, it could be the case that the link is present. 
 
As for children's health, we do not observe any significant change of hands of decisions, 
albeit the relationship is positive, while there is a significant relationship between 
changes in relative female earnings and child health. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that mothers are able to make more use of the power they already have. Given 
that the wife and the husband continue to make decisions on child health jointly, with a 
little extra income compared to the husband, the wife might have a stronger say in the 
matter than before. While we do not observe a change in the health decision-making 
power variable, the increase in relative earnings might just strengthen her actual 
bargaining power in the matter. 
 
Overall, these, at first sight contrasting, results highlight the limitations of the decision-
making power measure. In the end, it is an attempt to quantify decision-making power 
and to capture changes in decision-making over time. Possibly this measure is too 
simplistic to capture the dynamics and all dimensions of household decision-making. 
Especially given that the far majority of couples report making decisions on children 
jointly for both years, where we cannot observe whom of the two parents actually has 
the strongest say in the matter. This quantitative measure may not be an adequate 
substitute for a field study and participatory observation to investigate changes in 
household decision-making. 
 
 
  
 34 
 
 
 
Robustness 
 
Table 3, 4 and 5 report the average effect of women's financial bargaining power for all 
households in my sample. However, it can be questioned whether the effect of an 
increase in women's bargaining power is the same for households that start off with low 
level of female earnings compared to those that report already a relatively high female 
income in 2000. One could argue that for families that start off from a low base level of 
women empowerment, even larger effects are to be expected. A small increase in the 
women's income, while keeping the income of the husband constant, would mean a 
large change in their actual bargaining power within the household. Hence, we would 
expect large changes in the outcomes of their children. This is what we are going to 
investigate now. For this purpose, I split the sample into two sub-samples based on the 
earnings of the median mother in 2000. Subsequently, I run the estimations on child 
health separately for the sample of families with low female earnings and for the sample 
of families that have high female earnings compared to the median.   
 
Table 6 shows the results of the estimations for the two sub-samples. We find little 
significant effects but this is likely due to the smaller sample size, which raises the 
standard errors. We do find evidence for heterogeneous effects. Overall, the effects of 
bargaining power on child health are much larger for households that report high female 
income. For these households, an increase of roughly 1% in the relative earnings of the 
mother compared to that of the husband leads to a rise in reported health condition of 
the child of nearly one category (so moving from "somewhat healthy" to "very healthy", 
for example), ceteris paribus. The same improvement in child health requires an 
increase of about 2.5% in relative female earnings for families that start off with 
relatively low female earnings in 2000. 
 
However, if we evaluate the effects in absolute terms, we get a more nuanced picture. 
Given that the median mother earns 4.800.000 rupiah if she is classified as a high 
earner, an increase of 1% in relative earnings amounts to an increase of 48.000 rupiah 
on yearly basis. For the low income group, the median mother earns about 720.000 
rupiah per year. So for a similar improvement in child's health, we would be looking at 
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rise of 18.000 rupiah per year for her earnings. Comparing how feasible these income 
changes are for the different groups goes beyond the scope of this paper, but the larger 
effect of the high earning mothers on child health is at least partly explained by the fact 
that we are looking at a larger absolute change in income. 
 
Table 6: Heterogeneous effects on child health across families with high female earnings and low female 
earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High female earnings Low female earnings 
 All children Boys Girls All children Boys Girls 
Relative female 
earnings 
0.979** 
(0.462) 
0.632 
(0.623) 
1.071 
(0.672) 
0.390 
(0.305) 
0.647 
(0.404) 
0.390 
(0.629) 
Household size -0.00378 
(0.00990) 
0.00672 
(0.0111) 
-0.0169 
(0.0386) 
0.0337 
(0.0215) 
0.0542 
(0.0352) 
0.0118 
(0.0293) 
Boy 0.0109 
(0.0486) 
 
 
 
 
-0.00264 
(0.0463) 
 
 
 
 
Age child 0.00299 
(0.00654) 
-0.00392 
(0.0107) 
0.00598 
(0.0144) 
0.00827 
(0.00635) 
0.00740 
(0.0107) 
0.00353 
(0.0148) 
Urban 0.175* 
(0.104) 
0.147 
(0.137) 
0.248 
(0.179) 
0.357*** 
(0.116) 
0.415*** 
(0.144) 
0.278 
(0.293) 
Education parents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age parents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religious 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of children 868 464 404 854 467 387 
No. of households  337  242 223 351 258 229 
Adj. R
2
 
0.152 0.235 0.067 0.109 -0.017 0.164 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimation includes household fixed effects and a time 
dummy for the year 2007/2008. A detailed description of all variables can found in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
***, **, and * indicate statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
 
Descriptive statistics from Table A5 indicate that overall mothers with relatively high 
earnings do report a somewhat larger decision-making power in the household. This 
implies that mothers with low earnings indeed come from a lower base level of 
empowerment. On average, high income mothers make 4 decisions more than their 
husband on household affairs, while mothers with a lower income report making 3 
decisions more than their spouse. 
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Also, Table 6 reveals that mothers with a high income have a very strong preference for 
girls, while an income increase of low income mothers has a larger impact on boys' 
health. This is a remarkable finding. Since we control for unobserved factors that stay 
constant over time, the difference cannot be due to unobserved differences between 
households, like progressiveness. One explanation for this result could be a different 
socio-economic background of the households. If households with low female earnings 
are located in agricultural settings where it is mostly men that generate income by 
working on the land, then investing in boys' health would be more economical. 
Descriptive statistics indicate that about 64% of families with high low earnings live in 
rural areas, while the same figure is 45% for families with high female earnings. 
However, when we run a regression dividing the sample into rural and urban households 
(results are in Table A7 of the Appendix), we find that an increase in the relative female 
earnings has a stronger effect on the health of daughters for rural households. Hence, an 
agricultural location is not likely to be the explanation for the observed difference in 
preferences. 
 
An alternative explanation for the preference for sons among low income mothers is that 
it could be a catch-up effect. Are sons more deprived health-wise in families with low 
female earnings? Descriptive statistics in Table A6 in the Appendix do not provide 
strong evidence for this. Just as we saw for the entire sample in Table 2, boys are indeed 
slightly worse off in terms of health compared to girls in 2000, but the difference is very 
small and not statistically significant. Similarly, in families with high female earnings, 
girls are not deprived in terms of health compared to boys. In short, there is no strong 
evidence for a catch-up effect as an explanation for the different preferences among 
households with high and low female earnings. 
 
Another option is that women with a relatively low income are indeed less empowered. 
It could be the case that their decisions reflect the preferences of the father more. This 
brings us to the question whether women really retain control over their own earnings. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
This thesis aims to retrace the effect of women's financial bargaining power on the 
health and education of their children in Indonesian communities. Majlesi, 2015; Qian, 
2008; Bobonis, 2009; Duflo, 2003; Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997). This is the 
rationale behind micro-finance schemes and conditional cash transfer programmes 
specifically targeted at women. However, it remains a challenge to find a good proxy for 
bargaining power that truly reflects the decision-making power of the mother in the 
household. Unlike most studies in the literature (an exception is Majlesi, 2015), I have a 
direct measure of women's decision-making. In this way, this thesis aims to track 
whether decisions made in the household change hands as the income of the mother 
rises. 
 
Another distinct approach of this thesis is that I use a panel data model (following 
Majlesi, 2015). I use data from a household survey called the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey from the year 2000 and a second wave from the year 2007/2008. Observing the 
households over multiple time periods allows me to use a fixed effects methodology and 
correct for unobserved differences between households that are constant over time. In 
this way we can control for factors that we are worried about, like progressiveness and 
family background. The model exploits variation in the variables within households, i.e. 
between siblings and over time.  
 
Coming back to the question posed in the beginning of this thesis: does it matter who 
makes the money in the household? This thesis provides some evidence that it does 
matter. When the income of the mother rises compared to that of the husband, there is a 
significant and positive effect on the reported health condition of her children. 
Evaluated at the level of earnings of the median household in our dataset, our findings 
indicate that a rise in the yearly income of the mother from 3.250.000 rupiahs to 
3.400.000 rupiahs will change the reported health status of the child from "unhealthy" to 
"very healthy", given that the income of the father remains unchanged. Since the 
information on earnings likely suffers from measurement error, which is exacerbated by 
the fixed effects approach, the found effects should be considered as a lower bound.  
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Also, the effect for girls is about 30% larger compared to boys. This is consistent with 
findings from across the developing world, that indicate that mothers have a preference 
for investment in girls (Duflo, 2012), possibly because girls were lagging behind in 
terms of health and other conditions compared to boys. This is not the case in my data. 
Our findings are consistent with evidence on Mexico from Majlesi (2015). He uses 
labour market opportunities for women as a proxy for bargaining power and finds more 
significant effects on child health for girls. However, we do not find any significant 
effect on the education of children. This could be due to the broad educational 
categories that this thesis uses, as opposed to a more progressive measure of schooling, 
such as years of schooling. 
 
A further exploration reveals that actually the preference for daughters is driven by 
mothers with a relatively high income. Mothers with a relatively low income display 
stronger effects on reported health condition for sons instead. This is not a catch-up 
effect, as there are no significant differences between boys and girls in 2000, nor can the 
observed difference in preferences be attributed to an agricultural (rural) location. It is 
not clear why this difference arises. The preference issue requires further investigation. 
 
As for mechanisms behind the found effects, we find that an increase in the income of 
the mother is positively but not significantly related with the total number of decisions 
she makes in the household. Curiously, as the income of the mother rises, her decision-
making power over children's education increases, while her influence over child health 
does not change significantly. 
 
However, there are several results for caution when interpreting the findings of this 
thesis. The entire analysis hinges on two big assumptions. The first one is that married 
women keep control over their own earnings. This is what makes earnings a valid proxy 
for women's financial bargaining power. It can questioned how realistic this assumption 
is given the sheer diversity of cultures in Indonesia (to give an idea, more than 700 
languages are spoken in Indonesia). The study by Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg 
(1997) indicates that there is already a large variation in whether women are allowed to 
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retain ownership over the assets she brought to the marriage. It is necessary to further 
investigate the different cultural and legal contexts and how these by itself own 
influence women's bargaining power, suggesting large heterogeneous effects across 
women in different places in Indonesia. The second assumption is that mothers and 
fathers have different preferences, which we try to infer, but cannot really test and also 
requires further investigation. 
 
Women's earned income as a proxy for bargaining power is critiqued for the fact that it 
is an outcome of the bargaining process within the household, rather than as measure of 
women's bargaining power itself (Doss, 2013 and Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg, 
1997). Whether a woman works and how much she works could be all outcomes of the 
bargaining progress. This would make labour earnings endogenous to our model.  
 
Consequently, the independence assumption would fail. The main identifying 
assumption of the model is that the independent variables are unrelated to the error term. 
If the reason that the wife's income has increased over time is a more progressive 
attitude of her husband, then the same change of attitude may also be responsible for 
better health and education of the children. Hence, the fixed effects approach would fail 
if important unobserved factors, like progressiveness, are not fixed over time and 
women's earnings is an outcome of household bargaining progress, rather than an input. 
 
Using information on household decision-making in addition is an interesting exercise, 
but not extremely helpful. The measure we constructed has its limitations. First of all, it 
is subjective, as the information is given by the wife. It is her perception of her power, 
which might be different from the actual situation. It could be the case that mothers just 
perceives themselves as more powerful as their income rises, while actual household 
decision-making does not change. Also, it is a simplistic, uni-dimensional measure of 
power as it is just the number of decisions made by the wife minus the no. of decisions 
made by the husband. It can be questioned whether this quantitative measure really 
captures the dynamics in household decision-making over time. Future investigations 
can improve upon this by a field study with participatory observation. In addition, one 
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could explore how the results differ when the answers on decision-making questions in 
the survey by husbands are used instead. 
 
Also, our main dependent variable of interest is subjective. The overall health condition 
of the child is reported by the mother. Only comparing answers given by the same 
mother, helps us get rid of some of the bias, but there could still be a problem. Perhaps 
when women become financially better off, they perceive their children as more healthy 
because overall the conditions in the household are better. The measure does not tell us 
anything about whether parents actually invest more money in the nutrition or medicine 
for their children. Future research on Indonesia could incorporate weight-for-height and 
height-for-age measures as more objective indicators for the health of children. 
 
However, our findings are supported by other empirical work on the topic that use an 
exogenous shock to women's earnings for identification. As the shock is not related to 
household bargaining progress, these studies get around the endogeneity problem. These 
studies exploit changes in demand for labour in China (Qian, 2008) and in Mexico 
(Majlesi, 2015). They do suggest a causal relationship between women's bargaining 
power and child outcomes. However, then again, this does not automatically imply that 
our findings are valid for Indonesia; the assumption that women's retain control over 
their earnings should be assessed in the each separate local context.  
 
Overall, women empowerment seems like a promising pathway for development. This 
implies improving labour market opportunities for women, strengthening the rights of 
women in the realm of marriage and divorce and overall creating a level playing field 
for both genders. The idea is that improved opportunities and rights for women will give 
them more power in the household and will result in better outcomes for children. As 
early development of human capital, both in terms of knowledge and health, is vital for 
productivity later in life (Duflo, 2003), this seems like a viable development strategy. 
However, based on this analysis, we cannot really say much about the effects for women 
do not work. Since we already found quite different results for mothers that start off 
with a low income and mothers who make relatively high earnings, it seems hard to 
extrapolate our findings to mothers who do not report an independent income at all. 
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Future research could look at how women empowerment spills over to other fields of 
household decision-making that are considered important for development, like savings 
behaviour of poor households and investment in goods such as malaria nets. Also, it 
should assess how creating a level playing field for both genders can best be achieved 
and how cost-effective it is as a development strategy. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Definition of socio-economic variables used in the analysis 
Variables Definition 
Educational level The highest level of school attended by children in the household. Hereby 
we use the following education categories:  
1 = No education or kindergarten 
2 = Elementary education 
3 = Junior high school 
4 = Senior high school and vocational education 
5 = College and university. 
Health condition Health condition as reported by the mother of the child. The following 
categories are distinguished: 
1 = Unhealthy 
2 = Somewhat unhealthy 
3 = Somewhat healthy 
4 = Very healthy. 
Age Age of the household member in years. 
Boy A dummy variable that takes on value "0" if the child is a girl, and value 
"1" if the child is a boy. 
Log earnings of mother 
and father 
Logarithm of yearly income in rupiah from the primary and possibly 
secondary job. Earnings from both wage jobs and self-employed businesses 
are taken on board. As reported by the household member him- or herself. 
If this information was not available, I took the figure that was mentioned 
by the household head.  
Education level of mother 
and father 
The highest level of school attended by individuals in the household. 
Hereby we use the following education categories:  
1 = No education 
2 = Elementary education 
3 = Junior high school 
4 = Senior high school and vocational education 
5 = College and university. 
Household size Number of people living in the household, as reported by the household 
head. 
Muslim A dummy variable that takes on value "1" if the religious background of the 
household is Islamic, and otherwise "0". 
Protestant A dummy variable that takes on value "1" if the religious background of the 
household is protestant, and otherwise "0". 
Catholic A dummy variable that takes on value "1" if the religious background of the 
household is Catholic, and otherwise "0". 
Hindu A dummy variable that takes on value "1" if the religious background of the 
household is Hindu, and otherwise "0". 
Buddhist A dummy variable that takes on value "1" if the religious background of the 
household is Buddhist, and otherwise "0". 
Confucian A dummy variable that takes on value "1" if the religious background of the 
household is Confucian, and otherwise "0". 
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Urban A dummy variables that takes on value "0" if the household is situated in a 
rural area, and value "1" if the locality can be characterized as urban. 
No. of decisions made by 
wife 
This variable indicates how many decisions in the household are taken by 
the wife. The IFLS data reports on a total of 17 different categories, which 
are described in Table A2. The variable is weighted; if the decision is taken 
by the wife only (and possibly jointly with another household member who 
is not the husband), value "1" is assigned. If the decision is taken jointly by 
the wife and the husband (and possibly other household members), value 
"0.5" is assigned. 
No. of decisions made by 
husband 
This variable indicates how many decisions in the household are taken by 
the husband. The IFLS data reports on a total of 17 different categories, 
which are described in Table A2. The variable is weighted; if the decision 
is taken by the husband only (and possibly jointly with another household 
member who is not the wife), value "1" is assigned. If the decision is taken 
jointly by the wife and the husband (and possibly other household 
members), value "0.5" is assigned. 
Wife decision-making 
power 
No. of decisions made by wife minus no. of decisions made by husband. 
This variable intends to capture to what degree the preferences of the wife 
are reflected in the household decisions. 
Relative female earnings Ratio of the logarithm of the yearly income of the mother over the 
logarithm of yearly income of the father. A value of "1" indicates that  the 
yearly earnings of the mother and father are the same. An increase in the 
relative female earnings ratio suggests a rise in the financial bargaining 
power of the mother in the household. 
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Table A2: Household decision making questions 
 
We would like to know how your family makes decisions about expenditures and use of 
time. In your household, who makes decisions about: 
 
A1. Expenditure on food eaten at home 
B. Routine purchases for the household of items such as cleaning supplies 
C. Your clothes 
D. Your spouse’s clothes 
E. Your children’s clothes  
F. Your children’s education  
G. Your children’s health 
H. Large expensive purchases for the household (i.e., refrigerator or TV) 
I. Giving money to your parents/family 
J. Giving money to your spouse’s parents/family 
K. Gifts for parties/weddings 
L. Money for monthly arisan (savings lottery) 
M. Money for monthly savings 
N. Time the husband spends socializing 
O. Time the wife spends socializing 
P. Whether you/your spouse works? 
Q. Whether you and your spouse use contraception? 
 
Source: IFLS 3, Book 3A, SECTION PK (HOUSEHOLD DECISION-MAKING). 
 
Figure A1: Relative female earnings and decision-making power in 2007/2008 
 
 
 
Source data: Indonesian Family Life Surveys 
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Figure A2:  Relative female earnings and children's health in 2007/2008 
 
 
Source data: Indonesian Family Life Surveys 
 
Figure A3: Relative female earnings and children’s education in 2007/2008 
 
 
Source data: Indonesian Family Life Surveys 
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Figure A4: Distribution of residuals of child health 
 
Notes: This figure displays the distribution of the residuals of the regression in column (1) in Table 3. The 
dependent variable is the overall health condition of the child, as reported by the mother. Normality of 
distribution is rejected by the Shapiro-Wilk test. 
 
Figure A5: QQ-plot of residuals of child health 
 
Notes: This figure displays the QQ-plot of the residuals of the regression in column (1) in Table 3. The 
dependent variable is the overall health condition of the child, as reported by the mother. 
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Table A3: VIF-values of the regression of the effect of women's financial bargaining power on 
children's health 
Independent variables VIF 
Relative female earnings 4.15 
Age child 2.50 
Boy 2.23 
Household size 24.47 
Urban 12.70 
Education mother 74.69 
Education father 36.51 
Age mother 101.50 
Age father 87.26 
Muslim 37.77 
Protestant 13.60 
Catholic 134.73 
Hindu 1.83 
Confucian 1.51 
Year 2007 39.36 
Notes: This table displays the VIF-values of the regression in column (1) in Table 3. The dependent variable 
is the overall health condition of the child, as reported by the mother. There are no high VIF values for 
relative female earnings nor for the household dummies . The VIF values for the household dummies are 
omitted due to space, but are all below 5. There are no multicollinearity issues for the main variables of 
interest. 
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Table A4: Step-wise regression of the effect of women's financial bargaining power on children's health 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative female 
earnings 
0.621** 
(0.257) 
0.613** 
(0.257) 
0.608** 
(0.249) 
0.650** 
(0.253) 
Age child 0.00573 
(0.00453) 
0.00565 
(0.00451) 
0.00619 
(0.00452) 
0.00573 
(0.00453) 
Boy 0.00887 
(0.0331) 
0.00457 
(0.0332) 
0.00281 
(0.0333) 
0.00887 
(0.0331) 
Household size   0.0128 
(0.0264) 
0.00198 
(0.0274) 
Urban   0.250*** 
(0.0822) 
0.253*** 
(0.0827) 
Education parents No No Yes Yes 
Age parents No No No Yes 
Religious dummies No No No Yes 
No. of children 1722 1722 1722 1722 
No. of households 637 637 637 637 
Adj. R
2
 
0.115 0.115 0.122 0.129 
Notes: All estimations include household fixed effects and a time dummy for the year 2007/2008. This table displays 
the a step-wise version of the panel regression in column (1) in Table 3. The dependent variable is the health condition 
of the child as reported by the mother. The found effect appears to be very robust as the variable "relative female 
earnings" remains the same sign and significance level and approximately the same size, while other variables are added 
to the model. All children are included in the analysis. Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table A5: Descriptive statistics for all children in households (HHs) with high and low female earnings 
Variables Mean HHs 
with high 
female 
earnings 
Mean HHs 
with low 
female 
earnings 
Mean 
difference 
Std. dev. 
HHs with 
high female 
earnings 
Std. dev. HHs 
with low 
female 
earnings 
Std. dev. diff. 
Education level 2.037 1.941 0.095** 0.818 0.784 0.034 
Health condition 3.045 3.033 0.012 0.451 0.435 0.016 
Age 8.123 8.338 -0.215 4.578 4.640 -0.062 
Boy 0.536 0.546 -0.010 0.499 0.498 0.001 
Log earnings 
mother 15.468 13.233 2.235*** 0.733 1.108 -0.375 
Log earnings 
father 15.433 14.708 0.725** 1.010 1.051 -0.042 
Education 
mother 3.164 2.205 0.959*** 1.257 0.783 0.474 
Education father 3.406 2.385 1.022*** 1.186 0.911 0.275 
Age mother 36.268 35.931 0.337 5.207 6.271 -1.064 
Age father 40.346 40.885 -0.540 6.229 7.826 -1.597 
Household size 6.619 6.192 0.428*** 2.225 2.031 0.194 
Muslim 0.823 0.897 -0.074*** 0.382 0.304 0.078 
Protestant 0.087 0.012 0.075*** 0.282 0.109 0.172 
Catholic 0.018 0.009 0.009 0.134 0.095 0.039 
Hindu 0.072 0.077 -0.005 0.258 0.267 -0.009 
Buddhist 0 0.005 -0.005** 0 0.067 -0.067 
Confucian 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Urban location 0.548 0.335 0.213*** 0.498 0.472 0.026 
Wife decision-
making power 3.898 2.994 0.904*** 3.495 3.664 -0.168 
Observations 657 663 1320 657 663 1320 
Notes: A detailed description of all variables can found in Table A1 in the Appendix. Descriptive statistics are on information for the 
year 2000. The total sample is split into two sub-samples based on the earnings of the median mother in 2000. Households with high 
female earnings are those above the median earnings of the mother, while households that are below the median are reported as 
households with low female earnings. All variables have observations on 1320 children per year, except for general health status 
which was only reported for children that are younger than 15 years. This results in a total of 584 observations for families with high 
female earnings and 583 observations for children who come from families with low female earnings. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table A6: Descriptive statistics for girls and boys in households (HHs) with high and low female 
earnings 
Variables HHs with high female earnings HHs with low female earnings 
 Boys 
mean 
Girls mean Mean 
difference 
Boys 
mean 
Girls mean Mean 
difference 
Education level 2.023 2.052 -0.030 1.912 1.977 -0.065 
Health condition 3.041 3.048 -0.007 3.006 3.065 -0.058 
Age 8.168 8.072 0.095 8.351 8.322 0.029 
Log earnings 
mother 
15.469 15.467 0.003 13.177 13.299 -0.122 
Log earnings 
father 
15.397 15.474 -0.076 14.706 14.710 -0.004 
Household size 6.688 6.541 0.147 6.304 6.056 0.247 
Observations 352 305 657 362 301 663 
Notes: A detailed description of all variables can found in Table A1 in the Appendix. All variables have observations on 
1320 children per year, except for general health status which was only reported for children that are younger than 15 
years. This results in a total of 634 observations for boys and 533 observations for girls for child health condition. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
Table A7: The effect of women's financial bargaining power on children's health in urban and rural areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Urban areas Rural areas 
 All children Boys Girls All children Boys Girls 
Relative female 
earnings 
0.543 
(0.481) 
0.551 
(0.535) 
0.423 
(0.822) 
0.710** 
(0.298) 
0.532 
(0.399) 
1.092** 
(0.497) 
Household size 0.0148 
(0.0336) 
0.0961 
(0.0770) 
0.00913 
(0.0478) 
-0.0267 
(0.0447) 
0.0805 
(0.0663) 
-0.0876 
(0.0754) 
Boy 0.0464 
(0.0490) 
  -0.0366 
(0.0472) 
  
Age child 0.0464 
(0.0490) 
-0.00853 
(0.0136) 
0.0109 
(0.0149) 
0.00552 
(0.00605) 
0.00865 
(0.00907) 
0.00339 
(0.0137) 
Education parents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age parents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religious dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of children 781 416 365 941 515 426 
No. of households       
Adj. R
2
 
0.152 0.230 0.071 0.111 -0.013 0.169 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimation includes household fixed effects and a time 
dummy for the year 2007/2008. A detailed description of all variables can found in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
